__________________________________________________________________ Nikolai G . Wenzel From Dictatorship to Democracy – and from Dirigisme to Rule of Law ? Constitutional Learning in Argentina Since 1983 Introduction “ On September 6 , 1930 , crowds of Argentines stood in the streets of Buenos Aires , and cheered the army as it moved toward the [ presidential palace ]. Presisident Hipólito Yrigoyen , Argentina's first ‘ man of the people ,’ had just been forced to resign , and the remnants of the party were about to be ousted ” ( Davis 1995 , 71 ). Over the next 50 years , Argentina faced a total of 11 military coups and six military dictatorships . The final coup , in 1976 , enjoyed widespread support from a population exhausted and terrified by years of civil strife and economic stagnation . In 1983 , democracy returned to Argentina . Two years later , the military attempted another coup . But things were different this time . Contrary to prior coups , which enjoyed overwhelming popular support , tens of thousands of demonstrators descended into the streets , and refused to leave until the military uprising stopped . Democracy was safe . In 2001 , Argentina faced one of its gravest economic crises ever , as the country defaulted on its debt , the national currency lost two thirds of its value overnight , streets erupted into rioting and looting , and the country faced a string of five presidents in the span of two weeks . Chaos and political instability reigned . But there were no calls for military intervention . The twentieth century was marked by a waltz of legitimate and unconstitutional governments , as detailed in the following list : 1930 - 1932 de facto 2 years 1932 - 1943 de jure 12 years 1943 - 1946 de facto 3 years 1946 - 1955 de jure 8 years 1955 - 1958 de facto 3 years 1958 - 1966 de jure 8 years 1966 - 1973 de facto 7 years 1973 - 1976 de jure 3 years 1976 - 1983 de facto 7 years 1983 - ? de jure 28 years ( so far ) The constitutional regime that has been in place from 1983 to the present is the longest since the first military coup in 1930 . It has already weathered its share of crises , and Argentina is still plagued by weak institutions , generalized anomie and scant respect for rule of law . But something obviously changed between 1976 and 1985 . Nikolai G . Wenzel teaches economics at Hillsdale College ( Michigan , USA ). Financial support from the H . B . Earhart Foundation and the Mercatus Center at George Mason University is gratefully acknowledged . Laissez-Faire , No . 34 ( Marzo 2011 ): 60-74

__________________________________________________________________ This paper presents and analyzes both qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry for feeling the pulse of Argentina ’ s contemporary constitutional culture , and understanding Argentina ’ s contemporary political and economic woes . For a more detailed definition of constitutional culture — the general attitude , thoughts and feelings , conscious and unconscious , about the nature , scope and function of constitutionalism — see Wenzel ( 2007 and 2010a ). The first section synthesizes the results of qualitative fieldwork I conducted in Argentina . The second section corroborates the qualitative fieldwork through the findings of a quantitative study of Argentina ’ s contemporary political culture . The final section combines the two , drawing overall conclusions on Argentina ’ s contemporary constitutional culture and environment , and offering speculation about Argentina ’ s constitutional future . I . Qualitative Analysis : Field Research Report . I spent three weeks in Argentina in the summer of 2006 , during which time I interviewed almost 30 experts on constitutional law , history , economics , philosophy and culture . 1 . Methodology : Targeted Qualitative Analysis . results are combined . The Hernández survey was bound by a methodological straightjacket , as respondents were confined to numerical answers to questions . I was able to add subtlety to the questions , and give respondents the opportunity to add their own nuances . Furthermore , I was able to ask follow-up questions and ask for clarifications and deeper analysis , and respondents were able to build on my own questions to raise further topics . The Hernández survey drew 1 , 000 people at random ; I specifically targeted top experts and thinkers on constitutional matters . 1 And , finally , the survey asked for perceptions and personal opinions ; I asked for analysis and explanation ( a point especially relevant , since I suspect the Hernández survey , while quite good , did encounter problems of demonstrated versus expressed preferences , as I explain below ). I am aware of the limitations of my qualitative work . But I am also aware of the limitations of quantitative work , no matter how thorough and conscientious : the questions are limited and limiting ; respondents have no opportunity to elaborate ; respondents may say one thing and act another way ; and , generally , it is doubtful whether one can really package human behavior into discrete numbers ranging from one to ten . The combination of the two methodologies yields interest- There are significant advantages to qualitative work , especially when used to finetune or complement the rigor of quantitative work ( in this case , Hernández et al . 2005 , discussed in section II ); for all the formal and methodological advantages of quantitative work , qualitative has several distinct advantages , especially when the 1 I know I did not interview everybody — there were experts with whom I was unable to get an interview , and experts of whose existence I was not aware . However , I was gratified when one interviewee , author / lawyer / professor José Ignacio García Hamilton , looked at my list of interviewees , added two suggestions , then said , with a smile , “ ya tenés todos ” (“ you have everybody ”). __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 61

__________________________________________________________________ ing and insightful results , as the rigor and breadth of quantitative analysis can complement and be complemented by the depth and richness of targeted qualitative work . The methodology for the individual interviews was quite simple and straightforward . I started with a list of experts ; at the conclusion of each interview , I asked for follow-up reading and “ snowball ” interviewee suggestions . I tried to keep interviews as informal , relaxed and conversational as possible , in order to elicit candid responses . In each case , I started with a brief introduction of myself and my research . I then sought general comments , using a set of questions to guide the interviews . Although I ultimately asked all questions in each interview , I let the author's interest and the flow of the conversation take their own course . The field research report is more than 100 pages long . I thus limit myself to relevant summaries . 2 . Interview Themes . Instead of reporting on my field research by expert , I report here by theme . surfaced , pointing to Argentina ’ s “ adolescence ” as a society . Argentine society is not mature ; formal institutional norms are proposed , but they are too advanced for the society . Argentina is an immature , rebellious , chaotic country . The United States had its adolescence too , but it was less turbulent . The third element is high timepreference and lack of vision : Argentines exhibit impatience , and worry about the political crisis of the moment , rather than building long-term institutions and solutions . Attached to time-preference is a lack of cooperation and a lack of realism ( and thus pie-in-the-sky demands from the government ), which lead to social tensions and a strong sense of entitlement . Argentines think state services should be free ; this is a purely sentimental reaction , as there is no associated thought about who should pay — this was especially the case in the short-lived 1949 Peronist constitution , but remains in the positive “ rights ” 2 of Article 14bis to the constitution . Argentines eagerly violate the law in the name of attacking “ injustice ” ( which basically amounts to supporting entitlements ). a ) General Cultural Atavisms . I outline here common themes on Argentina ’ s contemporary culture which have a bearing on constitutional behavior . The first is the general legacy of Spanish colonialism . Whereas the United States was founded by families , Argentina was founded by adventurers . A conquistador would steal land and divide it among his friends . These days , things are the same , except wealth rather than land is plundered and divided ( generally , see Garcia Hamilton 2005 ). Second , psychological explanations Fourth , Argentina exhibits fundamental cultural dichotomies . On the institutional side , Argentines exhibit absolutism ( state above the individual ), religious intolerance , a rural society , militarization and a military society , and mercantilism . On the cultural side , Argentines see themselves as refined ( as opposed to boorish American cowboys who lack taste and manners ); show solidarity and honor ( as opposed to selfish , capitalist Americans ); value friendship and family 2 See Rand ( 1967 , 322-25 ) for a superb explanation of the patent philosophical absurdity of positive “ rights .” __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 62

__________________________________________________________________ ( unlike Americans who are individualistic and have splintered families ); have great heroes ( often military ); and are cultured ( as opposed to Americans who are obsessed with business ). Naturally , institutional outcomes are linked to the underlying individual behaviors , but Argentines do not see the link . 3 In Argentina , the citizen was invented according to a humanist model , in the Greek tradition ( where the educated man is multifaceted , and must excel at the arts , at sports and at general knowledge / wisdom ). This tradition lingers in the culture , as lawyers and psychologists are praised ; there is a public role for poets ; there is ( or was ) a political role for the military . But there is contempt for technical and practical skills . For example , one interviewee ’ s brotherin-law is an electrical engineer , yet the family refers to him dismissively as an “ electrician .” Lawyers talk politics and philosophy . 4 In this tradition , an Argentine economics minister once asked soccer / foot-ball star Diego Maradona for advice on how to run the economy . The thinking was that , since he had excelled 3 See , e . g ., La Porta et al . ( 1992 ) on trust in large organizations , Weber ( 1905 ) and Barro and McCleary ( 2003 ) on religion and economic performance ; or Fukuyama ( 1995 ) and Knack and Keefer ( 1997 ) on social capital and economic performance . See also Garcia Hamilton ( 2005 , 2006 ). Many thanks to Hernán Rodríguez Vagaria for the cultural explanations . in sports , he must be also a humanist who could offer advice on matters of state ! b ) Democracy : Established , but Incomplete . On average , between 1930 and 1976 there was a military coup every four years . The first coup was led by an oligarchy that had been excluded from power by an expansion of the franchise . Throughout the century , coups enjoyed the support of a population eager for order to be restored . Even the most recent coup ( 1976 ) enjoyed support of the major newspapers and a vast majority of the population . Civilian rule is now secure , as the constitutional culture has matured , and Argentines will no longer support a military coup . Democracy is now safe in Argentina : “ The core institutions of democracy remain strong in Argentina : elections are clean , civil liberties are broadly protected , and the military … has withdrawn from politics ” ( Livitsky and Murillo 2008 ). In 2001-2002 , at the height of the economic crisis nobody talked about a military coup . Argentina's democracy may be well established , but it is still fragile and incomplete . 5 This means , first , that democracy is seen merely as voting , rather than deliberation and citizen participation . Second , in the tradition of Rousseau ( see , e . g . Lewin 1967 ), there is an exaggerated worship of majoritarianism . Democracy is seen as majority rule , and nothing 4 In fact , I was surprised by the number of lawyers who teach philosophy , law and economics , or the history of ideas . Argentine founding father Juan Bautista Alberdi was already wrestling with such issues in the 1850s , when he emphasized the importance of practical education rather than the elite ’ s penchant for philosophy and the arts ( see 5 Generally , see the theory of “ delegative democracy ” as put forth by O ’ Donnell ( 1994 ): “ Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit , constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office .” For Alberdi 2002 [ 1852 ] and 1954 [ 1855 ]). commentary , see Peruzzotti ( 2001 ). __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 63