__________________________________________________________________ Alberto Benegas Lynch , Jr . * David Miller and Life Boat Situations : A Note From an article written by Professor David Miller 1 we quote the following : It is arguable , to say the least , whether the intuition that costs may not be imposed on individuals merely for the sake of a greater social good implies that no limitations of individual ’ s personal or property rights is ever permitted . Consider the following by way of analogy . Suppose ten farmers own adjoining pieces of land along the banks of a river . Because of changing meteorological conditions , there is the possibility of a disaster flood that would wash away every- * Alberto Benegas Lynch , Jr . holds two PhD ’ s : one in Economics and one in Business Administration . He is Professor of Economics at the Doctorate Program of the Department of Economics , University of Buenos Aires . He is President of the Department of Economics of the Argentine National Academy of Sciences , member of the Argentine National Academy of Economic Science , author of twelve books and co-author of five more . He is a former member of the Board of Directors of the Mont Pelerin Society and Senior Research Fellow at the Friedrich A . von Hayek Foundation . 1 “ The Justification of Political Authority ”, Robert Nozick , New York : Cambridge University Press , 2002 , David Schmidtz , ed . thing that the farmers have done to improve their land , unless all of them cooperate to raise flood barriers right along the river banks . One farmer refuses to raise barriers on his land , claiming that he has divine protection against flooding , or that he has private knowledge that the relevant weather conditions won ’ t occur , or given some such reasons . Is it permissible for the nine other farmers to force the refusenik to raise barriers on his stretch of the river ? I think it clearly is permissible , and that a description of this case as one of ‘ imposing costs on some for the greater benefit of others ’ [ in Robert Nozick ’ s words 2 ] misses its most important salient feature , namely that the vital interest of the nine farmers – the same interest that justifies the property rights in the first place – are put at risk if the tenth farmer is allowed to sabotage the cooperative solution 3 . Here we have , once again , an alleged justification for the use of force , not as a defensive device but as an aggressive step that infringes other people ’ s rights . Professor Miller probably has in mind that the monopoly of force should intervene , which has been labeled “ government ” by political philosophers at this stage of our 2 Anarchy , State and Utopia , New York : Basic Books , 1974 . 3 “ The Justification ...” op . cit ., p . 26 . __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 25

__________________________________________________________________ cultural evolution 4 . For the same matter , the case can also be discussed in a context of “ autogovernment ” 5 where competitive agencies of justice and protection compete in the way that have been described , among others , by Murray N . Rothbard , Bruce Benson , Walter Block , Hans-Hermann Hoppe , to which we should add interesting philosophical arguments related to game theory , such as those that have been presented by Anthony de Jasay 6 . In any case , the aforementioned quotation from David Miller should be analyzed in separate segments . If there has been a previous arrangement between the farmers that states that in case of dispute the conflict should be settled through , let us say majority vote , it would be perfectly legitimate to compel the tenth farmer to raise flood barriers . Obviously , this is not the case since Professor Miller is advocating the use of force as an exogenous device that appears ex-nihilo so to speak . No violence would be needed if an agreement as previously mentioned had existed , unless the tenth farmer 4 It is interesting to stress that Ernst Cassirer has said that “ I have no doubt that future generations looking at much of our political systems will have the same impression that a modern astronomer has when he reads a book of astrology , or a modern chemist when he sees a treatise of alchemy ”. El mito del estado , México : Fondo de Cultura Económica , [ 1946 ] 1992 , p . 349 [ The Myth of State ]. 5 Vid , Alberto Benegas-Lynch , Jr . “ Toward a Theory of Autogovernment ”, Values and The Social Order . Voluntary versus Coercive Orders , Aldershot , UK : Avebury Series in Philosophy , 1997 , vol III , Gerard Radnitzky , ed . 6 Specially in his collection of essays Against Politics , London : Routledge , 1997 . would decide not to honor his word . Of course , if one reads David Miller ’ s description one would easily conclude that , in that context , this is not either the case . In his analysis , we are confronted with another matter . Since knowledge is dispersed through different individuals in what we call “ society ”, ignorance must be taken on account . In our example we must accept that the tenth farmer may be right regarding what will happen with the meteorological conditions . But even if he does not have the necessary knowledge , the case shows that the other nine farmers are violating his property rights . Suppose it could be said that , in fact , “ as a consequence ” of not violating property rights , the flood finally arrives and destroys the land of the ten farmers . In the first place , it should be noted that there is no causal connection between the flood and property rights . Property rights did not cause the flood . It was caused by a meteorological catastrophe . It could be said that the flood would have been prevented if property rights were infringed violently . This could be said ceteris paribus . We do not know what would have happened in a contrafactual exercise , but for the sake of the argument suppose this is the case . In this line of argument , aren ’ t we accepting utilitarianism , balancing what we think are the benefits and the negative effects for different persons ? Aren ’ t we using some persons as a means for the ends of others ? Won ’ t this reasoning take us to sacrifice the rights of some for an eventual benefit that others would enjoy ? On what grounds can we say for sure that we have the knowledge to conclude that this and that causes a benefit or a problem ? On the other hand , suppose we have the knowledge , what are the moral foundations that allow us to sacrifice the right of one person or a group for __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 26

__________________________________________________________________ the benefit of others ? The main question here is that if we are allowed to destroy rights this would affect negatively all persons since nobody could claim a right independently of the so called “ social balance ”. We must take on account that all of us are circumstantially a majority and circumstantially a minority in different situations . Suppose there is a group that is considered systematically as a majority that is granted a “ right ” to exploit systematically the rest of the people . Evidently this would be institutionalized theft : a band is authorized to exploit the rest of the people . In a sense , this is , to a great extent , precisely what takes place in most countries . The result of this systematical exploitation causes negative results : insecurity and poverty . We should consider this problem , which appears to be a puzzle , still from another angle . If we reject the utilitarian view and accept a natural law approach 7 , in the sense that we should respect the nature , that is the attributes of human beings , why should this be so ? If one of the logical implications of human action is that , from our own point of view , we expect to be in a better position after our 7 For different approaches to natural law philosophy , vid . A . P . d ’ Entréves Natural Law , London : Hutchinson Press , [ 1951 ] 1977 ; John Finnis , Natural Law and Natural Rights , Oxford : Clarendon Press [ 1980 ] 1986 ; and Leo Strauss , Natural Right and History , Chicago : The University of Chicago Press , 1965 . To secure natural rights ( natural human attributes ) means to respect individual paths and different approaches to life , which should be differentiated from nature in general , so as to defend oneself from the rigors of nature : such occurrences as storms , earthquakes , plagues , etc . action takes place , why should we allow this to happen taking on account that the rights of third parties have not be infringed ? The answer is obviously that this is convenient and better for each person . But , isn ’ t this precisely a utilitarian approach ? The answer is a vehement no . Of course , institutional frameworks that protect private property will be convenient for each person . In this line of argument we may say that natural law is convenient but this is not a utilitarian approach since there are no social balances involved . In effect , there is no social balance , respecting natural law is convenient ( it is good for the individual ) simply because , in this context , each person may have its way if it is not permissible to resort to force so as to use the fruit of other people ’ s labor . In this scenario , individual prosperity is based on voluntary contractual agreements , freedom of choice and individual responsibility . The discovery process of rules of just conduct , compatible with natural order , allows that each person may follow the path that he or she esteems is in line with his or her particular life projects . Leaving aside Professor Nozick ’ s inconsistencies regarding the alleged “ invisible hand process ” which would eventually arrive at a minimal state 8 , he has elaborated one of the most powerful criticisms to utilitarianism : individuals are ends and not merely means ; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent . Individuals are inviolable [...] but why may not one violate persons 8 For a discussion on this topic , see Roy A . Childs , Jr . “ The Invisible Hand Strikes Back ”, Liberty against Power , San Francisco : Fox & Wilkes , [ 1977 ] 1994 , Joan Kennedy Taylor , ed . __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 27

__________________________________________________________________ for the greatest social good ? Individually , we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm : we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later ; we do some unpleasant work for its results ; some persons diet to improve their health or looks ; some save money to support themselves when they are older . In each case , some cost is borne for the sake of the general overall good . Why not , similarly , hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more , for the sake of the overall social good ? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good . They are only individual people , different individual people , with their all individual lives . Using one of these people for the benefit of others , uses him and benefits the others . Nothing more [...] The moral side constraints upon what we may do , I claim , reflect the fact of our separate existences . They reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can take place among us ; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good . There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others . 9 We should also say that , apparently , Professor Miller does not grasp the fundamental meaning of cooperative solutions since in the quoted analogy he states that the tenth farmer should not be allowed “ to sabotage the cooperative solution ”. As we understand it , David Miller is suggesting that the cooperative solution should in fact be sabotaged , since cooperation necessarily means voluntary agreements and respect for individual rights . As a reductio ad absurdum we surely wouldn ’ t conclude that Hitler ’ s policy was a “ cooperative solution ”. 9 Anarchy , ... op . cit ., p . 31-33 ; also see p . 28- 30 . We should also point out that Miller ’ s statement that “ the vital interest of the nine farmers – the same interest that justify the property rights ” is not at all clear . He assimilates “ the interests ” of the nine farmers with the tenth farmer ’ s property rights , and thereby justifies the invasion of the latter ’ s right . “ The vital interests ” of a bank thief are in no way the same interests of those who own the bank . As it is well known , the counterpart of a right consists in an obligation . If I earn an income of a thousand the rest of the members of society have a universal obligation to respect my income . But if I say that I have a “ right ” to receive two thousand although I do not earn it , if such said “ right ” is granted , this means that some other person ( or persons ) would be compelled to finance the difference , situation that necessarily means the infringement of these people ’ s rights . That is why those alleged “ rights ” are technically pseudorights , which are included in most of the contemporary written Constitutions . In an Orwellian fashion , those Constitutions are in fact a list of pseudorights : the right of a decent home , to education , to love and so on . These pseudorights also constitute malinvestments since the allocation of properties is not realized according to consumer tastes in voluntary arrangements contexts 10 . On the contrary , the use of aggressive force becomes necessary to achieve the aforementioned ends . This misallocation of scare resources will affect negatively wages and incomes in real terms due to capital consumption . 10 For some of the fundamental differences between the market process and elections in the political arena , see Bruno Leoni “ Voting versus the Market ”, Freedom and the Law , Indiannapolis : Liberty Fund [ 1961 ] 1991 . __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 28