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__________________________________________________________________
Alberto
Benegas
Lynch
,
Jr
.
*
David
Miller
and
Life
Boat
Situations
:
A
Note
From
an
article
written
by
Professor
David
Miller
1
we
quote
the
following
:
It
is
arguable
,
to
say
the
least
,
whether
the
intuition
that
costs
may
not
be
imposed
on
individuals
merely
for
the
sake
of
a
greater
social
good
implies
that
no
limitations
of
individual
’
s
personal
or
property
rights
is
ever
permitted
.
Consider
the
following
by
way
of
analogy
.
Suppose
ten
farmers
own
adjoining
pieces
of
land
along
the
banks
of
a
river
.
Because
of
changing
meteorological
conditions
,
there
is
the
possibility
of
a
disaster
flood
that
would
wash
away
every-
*
Alberto
Benegas
Lynch
,
Jr
.
holds
two
PhD
’
s
:
one
in
Economics
and
one
in
Business
Administration
.
He
is
Professor
of
Economics
at
the
Doctorate
Program
of
the
Department
of
Economics
,
University
of
Buenos
Aires
.
He
is
President
of
the
Department
of
Economics
of
the
Argentine
National
Academy
of
Sciences
,
member
of
the
Argentine
National
Academy
of
Economic
Science
,
author
of
twelve
books
and
co-author
of
five
more
.
He
is
a
former
member
of
the
Board
of
Directors
of
the
Mont
Pelerin
Society
and
Senior
Research
Fellow
at
the
Friedrich
A
.
von
Hayek
Foundation
.
1
“
The
Justification
of
Political
Authority
”,
Robert
Nozick
,
New
York
:
Cambridge
University
Press
,
2002
,
David
Schmidtz
,
ed
.
thing
that
the
farmers
have
done
to
improve
their
land
,
unless
all
of
them
cooperate
to
raise
flood
barriers
right
along
the
river
banks
.
One
farmer
refuses
to
raise
barriers
on
his
land
,
claiming
that
he
has
divine
protection
against
flooding
,
or
that
he
has
private
knowledge
that
the
relevant
weather
conditions
won
’
t
occur
,
or
given
some
such
reasons
.
Is
it
permissible
for
the
nine
other
farmers
to
force
the
refusenik
to
raise
barriers
on
his
stretch
of
the
river
?
I
think
it
clearly
is
permissible
,
and
that
a
description
of
this
case
as
one
of
‘
imposing
costs
on
some
for
the
greater
benefit
of
others
’
[
in
Robert
Nozick
’
s
words
2
]
misses
its
most
important
salient
feature
,
namely
that
the
vital
interest
of
the
nine
farmers
–
the
same
interest
that
justifies
the
property
rights
in
the
first
place
–
are
put
at
risk
if
the
tenth
farmer
is
allowed
to
sabotage
the
cooperative
solution
3
.
Here
we
have
,
once
again
,
an
alleged
justification
for
the
use
of
force
,
not
as
a
defensive
device
but
as
an
aggressive
step
that
infringes
other
people
’
s
rights
.
Professor
Miller
probably
has
in
mind
that
the
monopoly
of
force
should
intervene
,
which
has
been
labeled
“
government
”
by
political
philosophers
at
this
stage
of
our
2
Anarchy
,
State
and
Utopia
,
New
York
:
Basic
Books
,
1974
.
3
“
The
Justification
...”
op
.
cit
.,
p
.
26
.
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25
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cultural
evolution
4
.
For
the
same
matter
,
the
case
can
also
be
discussed
in
a
context
of
“
autogovernment
”
5
where
competitive
agencies
of
justice
and
protection
compete
in
the
way
that
have
been
described
,
among
others
,
by
Murray
N
.
Rothbard
,
Bruce
Benson
,
Walter
Block
,
Hans-Hermann
Hoppe
,
to
which
we
should
add
interesting
philosophical
arguments
related
to
game
theory
,
such
as
those
that
have
been
presented
by
Anthony
de
Jasay
6
.
In
any
case
,
the
aforementioned
quotation
from
David
Miller
should
be
analyzed
in
separate
segments
.
If
there
has
been
a
previous
arrangement
between
the
farmers
that
states
that
in
case
of
dispute
the
conflict
should
be
settled
through
,
let
us
say
majority
vote
,
it
would
be
perfectly
legitimate
to
compel
the
tenth
farmer
to
raise
flood
barriers
.
Obviously
,
this
is
not
the
case
since
Professor
Miller
is
advocating
the
use
of
force
as
an
exogenous
device
that
appears
ex-nihilo
so
to
speak
.
No
violence
would
be
needed
if
an
agreement
as
previously
mentioned
had
existed
,
unless
the
tenth
farmer
4
It
is
interesting
to
stress
that
Ernst
Cassirer
has
said
that
“
I
have
no
doubt
that
future
generations
looking
at
much
of
our
political
systems
will
have
the
same
impression
that
a
modern
astronomer
has
when
he
reads
a
book
of
astrology
,
or
a
modern
chemist
when
he
sees
a
treatise
of
alchemy
”.
El
mito
del
estado
,
México
:
Fondo
de
Cultura
Económica
,
[
1946
]
1992
,
p
.
349
[
The
Myth
of
State
].
5
Vid
,
Alberto
Benegas-Lynch
,
Jr
.
“
Toward
a
Theory
of
Autogovernment
”,
Values
and
The
Social
Order
.
Voluntary
versus
Coercive
Orders
,
Aldershot
,
UK
:
Avebury
Series
in
Philosophy
,
1997
,
vol
III
,
Gerard
Radnitzky
,
ed
.
6
Specially
in
his
collection
of
essays
Against
Politics
,
London
:
Routledge
,
1997
.
would
decide
not
to
honor
his
word
.
Of
course
,
if
one
reads
David
Miller
’
s
description
one
would
easily
conclude
that
,
in
that
context
,
this
is
not
either
the
case
.
In
his
analysis
,
we
are
confronted
with
another
matter
.
Since
knowledge
is
dispersed
through
different
individuals
in
what
we
call
“
society
”,
ignorance
must
be
taken
on
account
.
In
our
example
we
must
accept
that
the
tenth
farmer
may
be
right
regarding
what
will
happen
with
the
meteorological
conditions
.
But
even
if
he
does
not
have
the
necessary
knowledge
,
the
case
shows
that
the
other
nine
farmers
are
violating
his
property
rights
.
Suppose
it
could
be
said
that
,
in
fact
,
“
as
a
consequence
”
of
not
violating
property
rights
,
the
flood
finally
arrives
and
destroys
the
land
of
the
ten
farmers
.
In
the
first
place
,
it
should
be
noted
that
there
is
no
causal
connection
between
the
flood
and
property
rights
.
Property
rights
did
not
cause
the
flood
.
It
was
caused
by
a
meteorological
catastrophe
.
It
could
be
said
that
the
flood
would
have
been
prevented
if
property
rights
were
infringed
violently
.
This
could
be
said
ceteris
paribus
.
We
do
not
know
what
would
have
happened
in
a
contrafactual
exercise
,
but
for
the
sake
of
the
argument
suppose
this
is
the
case
.
In
this
line
of
argument
,
aren
’
t
we
accepting
utilitarianism
,
balancing
what
we
think
are
the
benefits
and
the
negative
effects
for
different
persons
?
Aren
’
t
we
using
some
persons
as
a
means
for
the
ends
of
others
?
Won
’
t
this
reasoning
take
us
to
sacrifice
the
rights
of
some
for
an
eventual
benefit
that
others
would
enjoy
?
On
what
grounds
can
we
say
for
sure
that
we
have
the
knowledge
to
conclude
that
this
and
that
causes
a
benefit
or
a
problem
?
On
the
other
hand
,
suppose
we
have
the
knowledge
,
what
are
the
moral
foundations
that
allow
us
to
sacrifice
the
right
of
one
person
or
a
group
for
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the
benefit
of
others
?
The
main
question
here
is
that
if
we
are
allowed
to
destroy
rights
this
would
affect
negatively
all
persons
since
nobody
could
claim
a
right
independently
of
the
so
called
“
social
balance
”.
We
must
take
on
account
that
all
of
us
are
circumstantially
a
majority
and
circumstantially
a
minority
in
different
situations
.
Suppose
there
is
a
group
that
is
considered
systematically
as
a
majority
that
is
granted
a
“
right
”
to
exploit
systematically
the
rest
of
the
people
.
Evidently
this
would
be
institutionalized
theft
:
a
band
is
authorized
to
exploit
the
rest
of
the
people
.
In
a
sense
,
this
is
,
to
a
great
extent
,
precisely
what
takes
place
in
most
countries
.
The
result
of
this
systematical
exploitation
causes
negative
results
:
insecurity
and
poverty
.
We
should
consider
this
problem
,
which
appears
to
be
a
puzzle
,
still
from
another
angle
.
If
we
reject
the
utilitarian
view
and
accept
a
natural
law
approach
7
,
in
the
sense
that
we
should
respect
the
nature
,
that
is
the
attributes
of
human
beings
,
why
should
this
be
so
?
If
one
of
the
logical
implications
of
human
action
is
that
,
from
our
own
point
of
view
,
we
expect
to
be
in
a
better
position
after
our
7
For
different
approaches
to
natural
law
philosophy
,
vid
.
A
.
P
.
d
’
Entréves
Natural
Law
,
London
:
Hutchinson
Press
,
[
1951
]
1977
;
John
Finnis
,
Natural
Law
and
Natural
Rights
,
Oxford
:
Clarendon
Press
[
1980
]
1986
;
and
Leo
Strauss
,
Natural
Right
and
History
,
Chicago
:
The
University
of
Chicago
Press
,
1965
.
To
secure
natural
rights
(
natural
human
attributes
)
means
to
respect
individual
paths
and
different
approaches
to
life
,
which
should
be
differentiated
from
nature
in
general
,
so
as
to
defend
oneself
from
the
rigors
of
nature
:
such
occurrences
as
storms
,
earthquakes
,
plagues
,
etc
.
action
takes
place
,
why
should
we
allow
this
to
happen
taking
on
account
that
the
rights
of
third
parties
have
not
be
infringed
?
The
answer
is
obviously
that
this
is
convenient
and
better
for
each
person
.
But
,
isn
’
t
this
precisely
a
utilitarian
approach
?
The
answer
is
a
vehement
no
.
Of
course
,
institutional
frameworks
that
protect
private
property
will
be
convenient
for
each
person
.
In
this
line
of
argument
we
may
say
that
natural
law
is
convenient
but
this
is
not
a
utilitarian
approach
since
there
are
no
social
balances
involved
.
In
effect
,
there
is
no
social
balance
,
respecting
natural
law
is
convenient
(
it
is
good
for
the
individual
)
simply
because
,
in
this
context
,
each
person
may
have
its
way
if
it
is
not
permissible
to
resort
to
force
so
as
to
use
the
fruit
of
other
people
’
s
labor
.
In
this
scenario
,
individual
prosperity
is
based
on
voluntary
contractual
agreements
,
freedom
of
choice
and
individual
responsibility
.
The
discovery
process
of
rules
of
just
conduct
,
compatible
with
natural
order
,
allows
that
each
person
may
follow
the
path
that
he
or
she
esteems
is
in
line
with
his
or
her
particular
life
projects
.
Leaving
aside
Professor
Nozick
’
s
inconsistencies
regarding
the
alleged
“
invisible
hand
process
”
which
would
eventually
arrive
at
a
minimal
state
8
,
he
has
elaborated
one
of
the
most
powerful
criticisms
to
utilitarianism
:
individuals
are
ends
and
not
merely
means
;
they
may
not
be
sacrificed
or
used
for
the
achieving
of
other
ends
without
their
consent
.
Individuals
are
inviolable
[...]
but
why
may
not
one
violate
persons
8
For
a
discussion
on
this
topic
,
see
Roy
A
.
Childs
,
Jr
.
“
The
Invisible
Hand
Strikes
Back
”,
Liberty
against
Power
,
San
Francisco
:
Fox
&
Wilkes
,
[
1977
]
1994
,
Joan
Kennedy
Taylor
,
ed
.
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for
the
greatest
social
good
?
Individually
,
we
each
sometimes
choose
to
undergo
some
pain
or
sacrifice
for
a
greater
benefit
or
to
avoid
a
greater
harm
:
we
go
to
the
dentist
to
avoid
worse
suffering
later
;
we
do
some
unpleasant
work
for
its
results
;
some
persons
diet
to
improve
their
health
or
looks
;
some
save
money
to
support
themselves
when
they
are
older
.
In
each
case
,
some
cost
is
borne
for
the
sake
of
the
general
overall
good
.
Why
not
,
similarly
,
hold
that
some
persons
have
to
bear
some
costs
that
benefit
other
persons
more
,
for
the
sake
of
the
overall
social
good
?
But
there
is
no
social
entity
with
a
good
that
undergoes
some
sacrifice
for
its
own
good
.
They
are
only
individual
people
,
different
individual
people
,
with
their
all
individual
lives
.
Using
one
of
these
people
for
the
benefit
of
others
,
uses
him
and
benefits
the
others
.
Nothing
more
[...]
The
moral
side
constraints
upon
what
we
may
do
,
I
claim
,
reflect
the
fact
of
our
separate
existences
.
They
reflect
the
fact
that
no
moral
balancing
act
can
take
place
among
us
;
there
is
no
moral
outweighing
of
one
of
our
lives
by
others
so
as
to
lead
to
a
greater
overall
social
good
.
There
is
no
justified
sacrifice
of
some
of
us
for
others
.
9
We
should
also
say
that
,
apparently
,
Professor
Miller
does
not
grasp
the
fundamental
meaning
of
cooperative
solutions
since
in
the
quoted
analogy
he
states
that
the
tenth
farmer
should
not
be
allowed
“
to
sabotage
the
cooperative
solution
”.
As
we
understand
it
,
David
Miller
is
suggesting
that
the
cooperative
solution
should
in
fact
be
sabotaged
,
since
cooperation
necessarily
means
voluntary
agreements
and
respect
for
individual
rights
.
As
a
reductio
ad
absurdum
we
surely
wouldn
’
t
conclude
that
Hitler
’
s
policy
was
a
“
cooperative
solution
”.
9
Anarchy
,
...
op
.
cit
.,
p
.
31-33
;
also
see
p
.
28-
30
.
We
should
also
point
out
that
Miller
’
s
statement
that
“
the
vital
interest
of
the
nine
farmers
–
the
same
interest
that
justify
the
property
rights
”
is
not
at
all
clear
.
He
assimilates
“
the
interests
”
of
the
nine
farmers
with
the
tenth
farmer
’
s
property
rights
,
and
thereby
justifies
the
invasion
of
the
latter
’
s
right
.
“
The
vital
interests
”
of
a
bank
thief
are
in
no
way
the
same
interests
of
those
who
own
the
bank
.
As
it
is
well
known
,
the
counterpart
of
a
right
consists
in
an
obligation
.
If
I
earn
an
income
of
a
thousand
the
rest
of
the
members
of
society
have
a
universal
obligation
to
respect
my
income
.
But
if
I
say
that
I
have
a
“
right
”
to
receive
two
thousand
although
I
do
not
earn
it
,
if
such
said
“
right
”
is
granted
,
this
means
that
some
other
person
(
or
persons
)
would
be
compelled
to
finance
the
difference
,
situation
that
necessarily
means
the
infringement
of
these
people
’
s
rights
.
That
is
why
those
alleged
“
rights
”
are
technically
pseudorights
,
which
are
included
in
most
of
the
contemporary
written
Constitutions
.
In
an
Orwellian
fashion
,
those
Constitutions
are
in
fact
a
list
of
pseudorights
:
the
right
of
a
decent
home
,
to
education
,
to
love
and
so
on
.
These
pseudorights
also
constitute
malinvestments
since
the
allocation
of
properties
is
not
realized
according
to
consumer
tastes
in
voluntary
arrangements
contexts
10
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
use
of
aggressive
force
becomes
necessary
to
achieve
the
aforementioned
ends
.
This
misallocation
of
scare
resources
will
affect
negatively
wages
and
incomes
in
real
terms
due
to
capital
consumption
.
10
For
some
of
the
fundamental
differences
between
the
market
process
and
elections
in
the
political
arena
,
see
Bruno
Leoni
“
Voting
versus
the
Market
”,
Freedom
and
the
Law
,
Indiannapolis
:
Liberty
Fund
[
1961
]
1991
.
__________________________________________________________________
Laissez-Faire
28
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