__________________________________________________________________ Lucas Rentschler The Pursuit of Justice : Law and Economics of Legal Institutions Economics has a rich history of imperialism , in which the methodology of economics is applied to topics outside its traditional domain . The success of this phenomenon owes much to the insights said methodology provides . One of the most successful examples of such imperialism is public choice , which notes that political actors are likely to maximize their own self-interest , rather than societal well-being . That is , political actors are unlikely to act as “ benevolent dictators ,” and government failures are likely to emerge if this is not accounted for . The insights yielded by this research program have been , and continue to be , considerable . Given this remarkable success , it is natural to apply these same analytical tools to the legal system . This volume seeks to do just that . It explores environments which relax the assumption that legal actors necessarily act in the public interest , and examines the consequences of self-interested judges , district attorneys , and so on . This book unambiguously increases our understanding of the inner workings of the legal system , while simultaneously highlighting the need for a great deal of additional research . I am pleased to highly recommend this volume to those with an interest in how legal institutions behave in practice . My only quibble is that some of the content , while interesting , seems out of place . The volume begins with an excellent introduction by Edward López , which compares and contrasts public choice with law and economics in order to demonstrate the need for the application of the tools of public choice to legal institutions . Further motivation is provided by a description of recent legal trends which call for research of the type contained in the book . Many of these trends are not covered by subsequent chapters , which is suggestive of how much research is left to be done ! In Chapter 2 , Nicholas Curott and Edward Stringham argue that the emergence of government-run legal institutions in England was largely driven by the fact that by imposing fines for wrongdoing , as opposed to allowing restitution through private institutions , kings were able to raise revenue . That is , these institutions were developed to serve the selfinterest of the state . Chapter 3 , by Russell Sobel , Matt Ryan and Joshua Hall , provides a fascinating examination of how impending electi Review of The Pursuit of Justice : Law and Economics of Legal Institutions , edited by Edward J . López . New York : The Independent Institute , 2010 ( xi + 303 pages ). $ 25 . 50 ( softcover ). Lucas Rentschler ( PhD , Texas A&M Univ .), is Professor of Economics at Universidad Francisco Marroquín ( Guatemala ). Laissez-Faire , No . 36-37 ( Marzo-Sept 2012 ): 57-60

__________________________________________________________________ tions influence legal outcomes . The authors find electoral cycles in wrongful conviction rates among elected district attorneys in New York . That is , directly before an election , wrongful conviction rates rise , and then fall after the election . The scarcity of reliable data of the sort utilized here highlights the value of this contribution , and hopefully it will encourage additional research . This chapter also presents a second result with regards to electoral pressures . When a U . S . state appoints judges , rather than electing them , a subjective survey measure of judicial quality increases . Chapter 4 , by Roger Koppl , advocates changes in how fingerprint evidence is verified in felony cases . In order to combat erroneous convictions on the basis of incorrect fingerprint analysis ( resulting from honest mistakes or biased forensic scientists ), the author advocates triplicate analysis of said evidence . He argues that the direct financial benefits ( reduced incarceration costs of wrongful convictions ) far outweigh the increase in costs . Chapter 5 , by Adriana Cordis , is an empirical analysis of the effect of judicial independence on corruption ( measured by the number of public officials who are convicted of corruption ). The author also investigates the effect of constitutional rigidity on corruption ( using a country level index of perceived corruption ). This chapter poses interesting and important questions , and suggests the need for additional research . Chapter 6 is , in my view , the highlight of the book . In it , Aleksander Tomic and Jahn Hakes investigate the role of judicial selection in sentencing . Using a rich dataset , the authors find that the sentencing decisions of elected judges differ from those of appointed judges . In particular , the sentencing decisions of ( county level ) elected judges result in higher incarceration rates , but with shorter sentences , than their appointed counterparts . The authors argue that this may be explained by the fact that elected judges can pass the cost of crime deterrence to the state , as would be preferred by the voters they must face . Appointed judges , on the other hand , are subject to appointing boards who themselves are more sensitive to budgetary pressures . As a result , appointed judges have an incentive to reduce incarceration rates . Chapter 7 and 8 both discuss government taking powers . Chapter 7 , by Ilya Somin , examines the costs of using economic development as a rationale for such takings , and argues that it results in a classical government failure . Chapter 8 , by John Brätland , argues that just compensation for government taking is impossible . Both of these chapters are interesting contributions in their own right . In Chapter 9 , Benjamin Barton offers support for the so-called “ lawyer-judge hypothesis ,” which states that “ if there is a clear advantage or disadvantage to the legal profession in any given question of law , judges will choose the route that benefits the profession as a whole ” ( p . 169 ). This hypothesis is intriguing , but it must be said that the support for the hypothesis offered here is anecdotal ; this chapter is an interesting first step and invites more rigorous empirics . Chapter 10 , by Jeffrey Haymond , argues that the threat of certain class-action lawsuits allows politicians to extort private institutions . The author offers anecdotal support for this hypothesis , and finds empirical support for the claim that tobacco settlement money from the 1990 ’ s was diverted from anti-smoking __________________________________________________________________ 58

__________________________________________________________________ programs ( which is consistent with a rentextraction story of this famous lawsuit ). In Chapter 11 , Charles Keckler provides a fascinating look at what happens to money that is either unclaimed in class-action lawsuit awards , or administrative costs are sufficient as to make it infeasible to allocate the award directly to the class . In principle , judges should allocate “ the unclaimed fund to its next best compensation use , e . g ., for the aggregate , indirect , prospective benefit of the class .” 1 This chapter argues that judges often allocate this money in ways that benefit the legal profession , and that other legal conventions have evolved to increase the likelihood of this event . As evidence , the author uses Price v . Phillip Morris as a case study and notes that it was announced that 91 % of a $ 5 . 3 billion fund would be awarded to the legal profession , and the remaining 9 % would go to the American Cancer Society . Chapter 12 , by Adam Summers , is the last chapter in the book , and it discusses the myriad ways in which the legal profession has sought to erect barriers to entry to the legal profession . While these barriers are ostensibly a way to ensure quality control of legal services in an environment where asymmetric information is high , the author argues that the real reasons are anticompetitive . In my view , the biggest weakness of this book is that the various chapters represent wildly divergent topics and methodologies , perhaps because this research agenda is so new . López has ordered the chapters in such a way as to minimize the discontinuities , but it is hard not to feel that the book would have 1Herbert Newberg and Alba Conte , Newberg on Class Actions , 4 th ed . ( 2002 ), § 10 . 17 . benefited from a narrower focus . For example , the historical discussion of the emergence of government legal institutions beginning in 9th century England ( Chapter 2 ) is followed by an econometric analysis of the effects of electoral pressures on wrongful conviction rates and judicial quality ( Chapter 3 ). Further , while the majority of the chapters examine the consequences of legal institutions on the behavior of legal actors , a few chapters diverge from this theme and thus seem out of place . For instance , Chapter 4 is , for the most part , a cost-benefit analysis of the proposal for “ triplicate examination of fingerprint evidence of all felony cases going to trial in the United States ” ( p . 60 ). The chapter does include a discussion of the incentive structure faced by forensic scientists who are directly employed by law enforcement agencies , which relates to the book ’ s theme , but this discussion is only a small part of the chapter . More egregious examples can be found in Chapters 7 and 8 . Chapter 7 analyzes the problems with using economic development as a rationale for government taking and notes that the emergence of this rationale has implications for interest groups and politicians . Chapter 8 ( convincingly ) argues that it is impossible for the victims of government takings to be justly compensated if the taking is involuntary . While both of these papers are valuable in and of themselves , it is not clear how they relate to the stated aims of this volume . While it was a ruling of the U . S . Supreme Court which brought this issue to prominence ( Kelo v . City of New London ), this ruling simply upheld the actions of political actors ( the city councilmen of New London ), and it is politicians who decide to initiate government takings . As such , the examination of gov- __________________________________________________________________ 59

__________________________________________________________________ ernment takings seems squarely within the realm of public choice , and out of place in this volume . This book has a promising premise : that legal actors and institutions ought to be analyzed in the same way as their economic and political counterparts . Fortunately , most of the individual chapters deliver on this promise , and each one of them represents a valuable contribution to this emerging ( and hopefully burgeoning ) research agenda . ( Those that do not are , nonetheless , interesting and worthwhile endeavors .) The authors are to be commended , and I hope that the publication of this volume will spur further research in this , as yet , underdeveloped area . I highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in public choice or law and economics . At $ 25 . 50 , it is too good a bargain to pass up . __________________________________________________________________ 60