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__________________________________________________________________
Carlos
Rodríguez
Braun
Social
State
and
Anti-social
Envy
With
their
economic
principles
weakened
,
interventionists
have
ceded
somewhat
to
classical
liberal
doctrine
and
sought
refuge
in
a
moral
trench
.
Today
,
criticism
of
the
market
economy
no
longer
revolves
around
efficiency
.
Instead
,
supporters
of
State
intervention
justify
their
position
on
ethical
grounds
.
They
claim
that
the
model
of
a
redistributive
State
is
superior
to
any
alternative
because
it
has
more
moral
weight
:
typically
,
it
displays
more
humanitarian
benevolence
.
This
interventionist
claim
has
met
with
criticisms
.
Redistribution
,
for
one
,
not
only
discourages
investment
and
job
creation
,
but
introduces
perverse
incentives
(
individuals
fighting
over
the
redistributive
booty
instead
of
focusing
on
production
;
engaging
in
fraud
instead
of
cooperation
)
and
stifles
values
such
as
the
dignity
of
personal
effort
.
This
essay
maintains
that
interventionism
is
immoral
,
and
highlights
the
apparent
paradox
in
the
fact
that
the
social
State
generates
envy
,
which
is
the
most
anti-social
of
all
passions
.
1
Liberty
,
Economics
and
Morality
Anti-capitalist
traditions
had
a
distinct
economic
bent
.
Critics
of
the
market
argued
that
it
resulted
not
only
in
injustice
,
due
to
an
unequal
distribution
of
income
,
but
also
inefficiency
;
their
critique
maintained
that
capitalism
led
to
poverty
,
marginalization
,
exploitation
,
and
an
inefficient
allocation
of
resources
.
There
were
,
therefore
,
powerful
economic
reasons
for
the
State
to
interfere
in
markets
and
establish
a
combination
of
prices
and
quantities
of
goods
and
services
different
from
that
which
would
occur
under
unfettered
capitalism
.
It
is
no
coincidence
John
Maynard
Keynes
was
the
most
influential
economist
in
the
twentieth
century
.
His
basic
message
was
:
markets
work
poorly
.
1
Hayek
,
who
warned
against
fostering
envy
behind
the
mask
of
social
justice
,
recommended
it
be
viewed
as
Mill
defined
it
:
“
the
most
anti-social
and
pernicious
of
all
passions
”
(
Friedrich
A
.
Hayek
,
Los
fundamentos
de
la
libertad
[
Madrid
:
Unión
Editorial
,
1998
],
p
.
129
).
Mill
referred
to
envy
in
Chapter
4
of
On
Liberty
as
“
that
most
anti-social
and
odious
of
all
the
passions
.”
In
Representative
Government
,
he
adds
:
“
In
proportion
as
success
in
life
is
seen
or
believed
to
be
the
fruit
of
fatality
or
accident
,
and
not
of
exer-
Anti-Keynesian
economists
(
helped
by
an
economic
reality
that
combined
stagnation
,
inflation
,
taxes
,
and
unemployment
)
ended
up
refuting
the
core
ideas
of
Keynesianism
.
Intervention
in
the
market
did
not
seem
to
be
the
ecotion
,
in
that
same
ratio
does
envy
develop
itself
as
a
point
of
national
character
”
(
John
Stuart
Mill
,
Essays
on
politics
and
society
,
Vol
.
18
of
his
Collected
Works
,
ed
.
J
.
M
.
Robson
[
University
of
Toronto
Press
,
1977
],
p
.
279
,
and
Del
Gobierno
representativo
[
Madrid
:
Tecnos
,
2000
],
p
.
39
).
Carlos
Rodríguez
Braun
is
Professor
of
History
of
Economic
Thought
at
the
Universidad
Complutense
,
Madrid
,
Spain
.
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nomic
solution
.
For
its
part
,
the
collapse
of
communism
demonstrated
,
even
to
many
dogmatic
leftists
,
that
eliminating
the
market
did
not
exactly
bring
with
it
emancipation
and
prosperity
for
the
proletariat
.
Such
evidence
spurred
a
rapid
rearrangement
of
the
major
players
.
Communists
became
environmentalists
,
feminists
,
squatter
supporters
,
or
picked
from
a
variety
of
other
more
or
less
innocuous
causes
.
Many
abandoned
Marxism
and
surrendered
to
the
erstwhile
despised
social
democrats
,
which
they
considered
tepid
accomplices
to
capitalist
exploitation
.
Modern
socialists
o
social
democrats
had
the
advantage
that
the
fall
of
communism
,
or
the
so-called
real
socialism
,
did
not
implicate
them
.
Its
crisis
actually
gave
them
a
boost
:
the
collapse
proved
that
the
only
possible
socialism
was
their
brand
of
it
,
one
that
accepted
the
market
but
corrected
it
for
social
reasons
.
Socialists
quickly
buried
many
of
the
old
economic
objections
against
the
market
.
Tariff
protectionism
,
state-owned
companies
,
and
macroeconomic
regulations
,
three
classic
interventionist
economic
policies
,
soon
became
enemies
to
overcome
.
And
overcome
they
were
.
In
Spain
and
Latin
America
,
for
example
,
those
who
started
the
process
of
privatization
and
liberalizing
of
markets
—
even
the
labor
market
—
were
socialist
leaders
like
Felipe
González
.
This
is
how
we
arrive
at
the
contemporary
consensus
summed
up
in
the
phrase
:
“
the
market
is
good
,
but
…
.”
The
market
is
viewed
not
as
the
free
expression
of
popular
preferences
,
but
as
some
allocating
artifact
,
a
mechanism
that
happens
to
be
more
efficient
at
producing
goods
and
services
than
State
intervention
.
Interventionism
,
however
,
is
appropriate
(
according
to
a
tradition
dating
back
to
Stuart
Mill
)
not
for
producing
wealth
,
but
for
distributing
it
.
Taxation
is
no
longer
justifiable
when
used
to
subsidize
losses
incurred
by
State
enterprises
,
but
it
is
morally
admissible
and
even
mandatory
in
order
to
redistribute
income
.
Since
,
under
democratic
regimes
,
it
is
difficult
for
public
expenditure
to
go
much
beyond
50
percent
of
GDP
,
when
that
limit
is
reached
interventionists
looking
to
attain
or
maintain
power
tend
to
get
stuck
in
dilemmas
of
this
type
:
they
cannot
raise
taxes
for
fear
of
losing
elections
,
but
they
cannot
lower
them
either
,
because
that
too
would
be
electoral
suicide
,
viewed
as
conspiring
against
morally
indisputable
goals
.
This
leads
to
political
read-my-lips
style
flip-flopping
becoming
ever
more
common
in
Western
democracies
.
Partial
acceptance
of
the
market
in
no
way
suggests
classical
liberalism
has
won
the
battle
of
ideas
.
On
occasion
,
it
is
true
,
socialists
give
this
impression
,
and
they
talk
about
ultra-liberalism
or
even
an
imagined
powerful
libertarian
pensée
unique
that
is
nowhere
to
be
found
.
Despite
the
privatization
and
deregulation
rhetoric
of
economic
policies
,
a
cursory
analysis
of
the
main
doctrines
indicates
that
their
classical
liberal
component
is
little
more
than
window
dressing
most
of
the
time
.
It
all
fits
together
with
a
remarkable
event
of
such
supposed
wave
of
State-shrinking
classical
liberalism
or
neo-liberalism
:
the
weight
of
the
State
in
the
economy
,
measured
as
the
proportion
of
State
spending
in
GDP
,
has
not
diminished
markedly
anywhere
in
the
world
.
Nor
should
we
forget
the
interventionists
’
talent
for
hoisting
one
flag
while
lowering
another
;
the
environment
offers
an
interesting
example
.
The
people
now
defending
the
urgent
need
for
State
control
in
environmental
matters
show
the
same
enthusiasm
(
they
are
often
the
very
same
people
)
as
those
who
up
until
recently
argued
that
the
State
should
con-
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trol
or
play
the
leading
role
in
the
shipbuilding
or
steel
industries
.
The
idea
that
“
the
free
market
is
good
,
but…
”
guides
the
economic
doctrines
of
our
days
.
This
idea
is
defended
,
with
a
few
caveats
,
by
many
economists
and
,
with
much
less
caveats
,
by
the
overwhelming
majority
of
politicians
,
journalists
,
intellectuals
,
and
even
some
members
of
the
clergy
.
Widespread
understanding
of
the
complex
phenomena
making
up
the
extended
order
described
by
Hayek
in
The
Fatal
Conceit
2
is
unusual
and
explains
,
to
a
degree
,
the
many
interventionist
propensities
that
persist
.
When
the
French
socialists
in
times
of
Mitterrand
unveiled
their
plan
to
create
jobs
using
public
money
,
newspapers
delighted
in
agreeing
that
the
State
should
intervene
in
this
area
because
the
market
had
shown
itself
unable
to
generate
sufficient
employment
.
They
overlooked
the
fact
that
the
market
was
not
creating
employment
precisely
because
of
State
intervention
in
the
form
of
taxation
and
regulation
.
This
same
error
is
the
source
of
the
latest
interventionist
mantra
:
the
need
for
harmonization
to
check
the
supposed
dangers
of
globalization
.
The
fallacy
of
attributing
efficiency
to
the
market
but
kind
feelings
to
the
State
is
alive
and
well
;
so
too
is
general
ignorance
about
how
the
State
actually
operates
.
In
political
terms
,
the
fundamental
idea
of
classical
liberalism
—
the
limiting
of
power
,
Adam
Smith
’
s
“
obvious
and
simple
system
of
natural
liberty
”
devoted
to
placing
limits
on
sovereigns
’
ability
to
meddle
with
their
subjects
’
lives
and
property
—
has
yet
to
catch
on
.
3
All
this
said
,
classical
liberalism
has
clearly
secured
its
greatest
victories
in
the
field
of
economics
.
The
“
but
”
in
“
the
market
is
good
,
but
…
”
cannot
hide
this
mutation
.
In
short
,
the
market
’
s
enemies
now
claim
,
albeit
reluctantly
,
that
the
market
is
good
.
Nevertheless
,
classical
liberalism
finds
itself
in
a
subordinate
position
mainly
because
it
has
failed
to
convince
people
of
its
morality
.
There
remains
the
widespread
belief
that
life
’
s
higher
ideals
(
neither
wealth
nor
efficiency
will
ever
qualify
)
can
only
be
achieved
using
political
power
to
restrict
the
free
workings
of
the
market
.
This
interventionism
,
however
,
does
claim
to
represent
genuine
ideals
like
generosity
and
humanitarianism
.
At
the
beginning
of
the
1950s
,
in
times
of
the
apogee
of
economic
interventionism
,
Argentina
’
s
president
General
Perón
said
:
“
they
speak
to
me
of
economic
freedom
,
and
I
say
:
when
is
an
economy
free
?
If
the
State
does
not
direct
it
,
the
monopolies
will
.”
Many
interventionists
today
would
disagree
with
that
statement
.
Instead
,
they
would
argue
that
a
free
economy
is
unjust
;
that
society
cannot
abandon
the
poor
to
the
fates
of
a
competitive
market
and
to
suffer
the
humiliation
of
charity
.
There
is
no
guarantee
that
people
will
spontaneously
help
one
another
and
display
solidarity
.
The
State
must
intervene
and
,
at
the
cost
of
a
(
hopefully
)
little
loss
of
efficiency
and
freedom
,
redistribute
income
coercively
to
improve
the
lives
of
the
most
unfortunate
among
us
.
Probably
taxes
will
be
raised
,
but
it
is
for
a
good
cause
,
not
a
despicably
economic
one
,
but
an
ethical
and
egalitarian
one
,
in
sum
,
a
social
cause
.
2
F
.
A
.
Hayek
,
The
Fatal
Conceit
:
The
Errors
of
Socialism
,
ed
.
W
.
W
.
Bartley
,
III
(
London
:
Routledge
,
1988
).
3
Adam
Smith
,
An
Inquiry
Into
the
Nature
and
Causes
of
the
Wealth
of
Nations
,
ed
.
R
.
H
.
Campbell
and
A
.
S
.
Skinner
(
Oxford
:
Oxford
University
Press
,
1976
),
IV
.
ix
.
51
,
p
.
687
.
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How
to
start
from
equality
…
It
is
not
obviously
true
that
the
population
longs
for
restrictions
on
liberty
.
According
to
surveys
,
Spaniards
,
like
everyone
else
,
do
not
want
to
pay
more
in
taxes
.
The
fiscal
burden
,
however
,
measured
by
the
proportion
of
public
expenditure
over
GDP
,
has
doubled
over
the
past
30
years
.
Politicians
and
intellectuals
(
who
might
want
to
think
before
speaking
)
insist
that
,
since
Spain
is
a
democracy
,
“
society
”
decided
to
pay
more
in
taxes
.
Another
trick
is
what
the
State
says
it
does
and
what
it
actually
does
.
For
example
,
allegedly
it
cares
for
the
unfortunate
.
Anyone
who
takes
a
cursory
look
at
the
budget
will
see
that
spending
directed
toward
the
underprivileged
is
quantitatively
insignificant
;
the
majority
of
the
budget
is
dedicated
to
massive
income
transfers
among
various
groups
who
do
not
qualify
as
unfortunate
or
underprivileged
.
There
are
noteworthy
complexities
in
collective
choice
that
are
ignored
by
those
who
talk
about
the
“
social
”
as
if
society
(
no
less
)
were
manifested
exclusively
and
exactly
through
ballots
and
politicians
.
There
is
a
visible
gap
between
the
ideal
State
,
selfless
,
theoretically
obsessed
with
caring
for
the
poor
,
and
the
real
State
,
which
channels
resources
taken
from
citizens
to
the
buying
of
votes
and
the
seduction
or
appeasement
of
myriad
special
interest
groups
.
It
is
,
however
,
the
moral
weight
of
socialism
that
keeps
its
attractive
.
For
this
reason
,
let
us
take
on
the
interventionists
’
ethical
challenge
:
why
is
a
system
that
impedes
individuals
from
freely
assisting
their
fellow
human
beings
and
,
on
the
contrary
,
forces
them
to
do
so
through
fiscal
coercion
deemed
to
be
morally
superior
?
The
interventionist
’
s
reply
is
:
because
equality
is
a
moral
value
;
having
the
State
guarantee
equality
can
,
therefore
,
justify
the
limiting
of
freedom
.
This
is
a
fundamental
error
.
The
moral
value
is
that
of
equality
before
the
law
.
Such
is
a
major
achievement
of
the
rule
of
law
,
ensuring
that
no
one
is
discriminated
against
and
mistreated
by
the
powerful
or
that
the
powerful
can
arbitrarily
concede
privileges
to
a
chosen
few
by
reason
of
birth
(
high
or
low
)
or
luck
(
good
or
bad
).
And
this
equality
represents
a
moral
value
because
it
is
forever
associated
with
liberty
and
justice
—
it
is
no
accident
she
is
shown
with
her
eyes
blindfolded
.
It
is
also
linked
to
individual
responsibility
and
effort
,
and
to
the
dignity
of
people
in
control
of
their
destinies
.
State-imposed
equality
,
on
the
other
hand
,
reduces
liberty
,
as
it
requires
the
expansion
of
political
power
.
It
eliminates
the
essential
characteristic
of
justice
,
asking
her
to
remove
the
blindfold
and
treat
the
unequal
unequally
.
No
individual
right
can
stop
the
State
’
s
intervention
in
pursuit
of
such
a
noble
purpose
.
Such
forced
equality
,
in
the
style
of
an
uncomfortable
Procrustean
bed
,
inhibits
not
only
economic
but
also
moral
progress
.
…
and
arrive
to
envy
In
the
words
of
Adam
Smith
in
The
Theory
of
Moral
Sentiments
,
envy
is
a
“
disagreeable
sentiment
,”
an
“
odious
and
detestable
passion
,”
a
ruinous
tendency
that
blocks
a
pleasant
feeling
,
that
of
sympathizing
with
others
’
happiness
:
“
When
there
is
no
envy
in
the
case
,
we
all
take
pleasure
in
admiring
…
the
characters
which
,
in
many
respects
,
are
so
very
worthy
of
admiration
.”
4
No
one
is
proud
4
Adam
Smith
,
The
Theory
of
Moral
Sentiments
,
ed
.
D
.
D
.
Raphael
and
A
.
L
.
Macfie
__________________________________________________________________
Laissez-Faire
57
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