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__________________________________________________________________
Joshua
Hall
An
Economic
Approach
to
Conservation
:
The
Rhino
Conservation
Act
of
2005
The
Rhino
Conservation
Act
of
2005
1
A
Radio
Address
by
the
Zambezian
President
Joshua
Hall
is
a
Ph
.
D
.
candidate
(
Economics
)
at
West
Virginia
University
,
Morgantown
,
West
Virginia
,
USA
.
Introduction
Good
morning
.
Thank
you
for
taking
the
time
to
listen
today
.
I
know
how
expensive
radio
time
is
for
many
of
you
so
I
will
keep
my
remarks
brief
.
2
Tomorrow
I
will
sign
into
law
the
Rhino
Conservation
Act
.
This
act
is
designed
to
protect
our
indigenous
rhinoceros
population
and
stimulate
development
in
rural
Zambezia
.
1
This
essay
is
economic
fiction
,
in
the
tradition
of
the
work
of
Russell
Roberts
(
The
Choice
and
The
Invisible
Heart
)
and
Jonathan
Wight
(
Saving
Adam
Smith
).
While
the
country
Zambezia
,
its
newly
elected
president
,
and
the
Rhino
Conservation
Act
are
not
real
,
I
have
attempted
to
be
factually
accurate
about
the
rhino
situation
and
the
possibility
of
reform
along
the
lines
discussed
in
this
fictional
presidential
address
.
The
purpose
of
the
footnotes
is
therefore
to
provide
the
reader
with
additional
explanations
,
sources
of
information
contained
in
the
address
,
and
suggestions
for
further
reading
.
2
For
more
on
the
importance
of
radio
as
a
means
of
communication
in
Africa
,
see
Petra
Cahill
,
“
Bringing
Radio
to
Rural
Africa
,”
MSNBC
.
com
,
20
May
2004
(
http
://
www
.
msn
bc
.
msn
.
com
/
id
/
4953281
/)
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
I
am
taking
this
rare
opportunity
to
address
you
because
this
policy
represents
a
dramatic
departure
from
previous
government
policy
towards
the
black
rhinoceros
and
I
wanted
the
opportunity
to
explain
why
such
a
dramatic
change
is
the
appropriate
course
of
action
.
A
Short
History
of
Conservation
Attempts
One
thing
is
clear
:
Zambezia
’
s
attempts
to
save
the
black
rhinoceros
have
not
been
effective
.
According
to
the
African
Rhino
Specialist
Group
,
there
are
only
3
,
600
black
rhinos
in
the
entire
world
today
.
3
Given
how
low
current
numbers
are
,
it
is
difficult
to
believe
that
black
rhinoceros
used
to
be
plentiful
throughout
our
country
and
the
rest
of
Africa
.
The
black
rhino
population
was
estimated
to
be
as
high
as
65
,
000
in
1970
.
4
However
,
an
increased
demand
for
traditional
Asian
medicines
containing
black
rhino
beginning
in
the
early
1970
’
s
fueled
an
increase
in
poaching
.
By
one
estimate
,
the
black
rhino
population
in
Africa
fell
by
96
percent
from
1970
to
1992
.
5
3
http
://
www
.
rhinos-irf
.
org
/
rhinoinformation
/
populationtable
.
htm
(
accessed
10
May
2005
).
4
Mike
Milliken
,
“
Rhinos
by
the
Horn
,”
Cites
C&M
,
November
1996
,
6-13
(
cited
in
Michael
De
Alessi
,
Private
Conservation
and
Black
Rhinos
in
Zimbabwe
:
The
Save
Valley
and
Bubiana
Conservancies
[
Washington
,
DC
:
Competitive
Enterprise
Institute
,
January
2000
]).
During
the
past
thirty-five
years
the
Zambezian
government
tried
many
different
approaches
to
saving
the
rhinos
.
At
first
we
became
heavily
involved
in
international
attempts
to
make
the
trade
of
rhino
horn
illegal
.
Our
hope
was
that
the
stiff
penalties
associated
with
the
international
sale
of
rhino
horn
would
make
poaching
more
expensive
.
While
we
were
successful
in
getting
the
Convention
on
International
Trade
in
Endangered
Species
(
CITES
)
to
ban
the
international
trade
of
rhino
horn
in
1977
,
the
ban
proved
ineffective
in
discouraging
poaching
.
In
fact
,
the
resulting
decline
in
available
rhino
horn
actually
increased
the
profits
to
poaching
and
encouraged
poachers
to
step
up
their
efforts
.
6
Next
,
we
tried
“
dehorning
,”
where
government
employees
removed
the
horns
of
all
the
black
rhinos
in
Zambezia
in
hopes
to
eliminate
any
incentive
poachers
had
to
kill
the
rhinos
.
Again
,
we
were
wrong
.
It
often
takes
days
to
track
one
rhino
,
and
if
poachers
inadvertently
tracked
a
dehorned
rhino
,
they
would
often
kill
it
to
save
themselves
the
expense
of
accidentally
tracking
the
same
dehorned
rhino
again
.
7
Another
unforeseen
issue
with
dehorning
as
a
long
term
strategy
of
rhino
conservation
is
that
rhino
horns
grow
back
very
quickly
,
at
a
rate
of
nearly
9
cm
a
year
.
8
Nine
centime-
6
See
,
for
example
,
Michael
‘
t
Sas
Rolfes
,
Does
CITES
Work
?
Four
Case
Studies
(
London
:
Institute
of
Economic
Affairs
,
1997
).
“
If
anything
,
[
the
ban
]
led
to
a
sharp
increase
in
the
black
market
price
of
rhino
horn
,
which
simply
fueled
further
poaching
and
encouraged
speculative
stockpiling
of
horn
.”
5
WWF
,
“
Black
Rhinoceros
Fact
Sheet
,”
prepared
for
the
13
th
Meeting
of
the
Conference
of
the
Parties
to
CITES
,
Bangkok
,
October
2-
14
.
Available
online
at
:
http
://
panda
.
org
/
dow
nloads
/
species
/
ecop13blackrhinofactsheet
.
pdf
7
De
Alessi
,
Private
Conservation
and
Black
Rhinos
in
Zimbabwe
.
8
Joel
Berger
,
Carol
Cunningham
,
A
.
Archie
Gawuseb
,
and
Malan
Lindeque
,
“‘
Costs
’
and
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
ters
of
horn
can
garner
a
poacher
several
thousand
dollars
on
the
black
market
,
meaning
it
will
not
take
long
after
dehorning
for
a
rhino
to
once
again
become
a
target
of
poachers
.
Furthermore
,
researchers
found
that
poachers
do
not
discriminate
between
large
and
small
horned
rhinos
,
and
so
dehorned
rhinos
are
not
immune
from
attempted
poaching
.
9
Even
if
poachers
did
discriminate
,
in
a
country
as
sparsely
populated
as
Zambezia
,
it
was
impossible
to
keep
track
of
the
regeneration
of
rhino
horns
.
Knowing
this
,
poachers
continued
to
cross
our
borders
and
indiscriminately
kill
rhinos
in
the
hopes
that
they
had
a
harvestable
horn
.
Dehorning
also
had
two
additional
problems
that
made
it
an
unsuitable
rhino
conservation
strategy
for
Zambezia
.
First
,
there
was
some
evidence
that
rhino
calf
mortality
increased
after
dehorning
because
hornless
mother
rhinos
had
difficulties
defending
their
young
from
predators
.
10
Second
,
dehorning
was
a
very
expensive
process
,
costing
up
to
$
1000
per
rhino
.
11
It
soon
became
apparent
that
it
was
politically
untenable
to
spend
so
much
money
on
rhino
conservation
when
so
many
of
our
citizens
are
living
in
abject
poverty
.
Most
recently
our
government
tried
to
limit
poaching
by
creating
Rhino
Protec-
Short-Term
Survivorship
of
Hornless
Black
Rhinos
,”
Conservation
Biology
,
7
(
December
1993
):
920-24
.
tion
Zones
.
These
zones
were
sanctuaries
for
rhino
that
were
patrolled
by
antipoaching
security
forces
.
At
first
,
the
sanctuaries
worked
fairly
well
.
However
,
two
problems
quickly
arose
.
First
,
like
dehorning
,
the
Rhino
Protection
Zones
were
very
expensive
and
political
support
for
them
was
extremely
weak
.
Second
,
corruption
proved
to
a
very
big
problem
.
The
potential
gains
from
poaching
one
rhino
were
more
than
a
security
force
member
would
make
in
an
entire
year
.
While
Rhino
Protection
Zones
did
a
good
job
of
protecting
from
external
poachers
,
they
seemed
to
exacerbate
internal
poaching
.
12
The
failure
of
these
three
approaches
is
why
the
first
thing
I
did
upon
entering
office
was
to
convene
a
task
force
to
study
the
issue
and
propose
a
solution
.
Their
recommendations
have
manifested
themselves
in
the
Rhino
Conservation
Act
.
The
Reasons
Why
Our
Past
Efforts
Failed
Before
discussing
what
the
Rhino
Conservation
Act
will
do
,
let
me
explain
to
you
why
Zambezia
’
s
previous
efforts
to
save
the
black
rhinos
have
failed
.
It
is
my
hope
that
if
you
understand
why
our
past
efforts
have
failed
,
you
will
better
understand
the
need
to
make
such
a
radical
change
in
policy
.
9
ibid
.
10
Joel
Berger
and
Carol
Cunningham
,
“
Phenotypic
Alterations
,
Evolutionary
Significant
Structures
,
and
Rhino
Conservation
,”
Conservation
Biology
,
8
(
Sept
1994
):
833-40
.
11
De
Alessi
,
Private
Conservation
and
Black
Rhinos
in
Zimbabwe
,
p
.
3
.
12
This
discussion
draws
on
the
history
of
Zimbabwe
’
s
Intensive
Protection
Zones
(
IPZs
).
According
to
Michael
De
Alessi
,
“
The
IPZs
were
an
improvement
,
but
failed
to
address
the
corruption
issue
or
to
adequately
protect
the
remaining
rhinos
”(
Private
Conservation
and
Black
Rhinos
in
Zimbabwe
,
p
.
4
).
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The
primary
reason
for
the
failure
of
rhino
conservation
in
Zambezia
is
because
Zambezians
had
insufficient
incentive
to
protect
the
rhino
;
rhinos
are
common
property
.
In
one
sense
this
is
a
good
thing
,
because
all
of
our
people
have
a
vested
interest
in
the
fate
of
the
rhino
.
However
,
when
it
comes
to
actually
taking
steps
to
protect
the
rhino
,
few
Zambezians
have
incentives
to
prevent
poaching
.
This
was
not
a
problem
as
long
as
the
demand
for
rhino
horn
was
low
.
This
is
why
so
many
rural
villagers
are
hostile
to
rhino
conservation
efforts
.
Not
because
they
are
anti-rhino
,
but
because
they
do
not
see
current
conservation
efforts
accomplishing
more
than
13
For
more
on
the
importance
of
property
hurting
them
.
Not
only
did
past
conserva-
rights
to
encouraging
property
owners
to
__________________________________________________________________
Laissez-Faire
101
tion
efforts
take
valuable
aid
dollars
away
from
rural
villagers
,
but
villagers
were
prevented
from
protecting
their
own
property
from
the
rhinos
.
Furthermore
,
the
level
of
resentment
from
the
rural
villagers
to
the
city
dwellers
is
extremely
high
because
the
villagers
feel
as
though
they
are
bearing
the
entire
burden
of
protecting
the
rhino
.
The
Rhino
Conservation
Act
As
the
demand
for
rhino
horn
increased
,
the
fact
that
the
black
rhinos
were
common
property
became
problematic
.
While
poachers
had
a
lot
to
gain
from
killing
a
black
rhino
and
harvesting
its
horn
,
each
individual
Zambezian
had
nothing
to
gain
and
much
to
lose
by
stopping
the
poachers
.
Even
collectively
we
had
little
incentive
to
stop
the
poaching
because
the
cost
was
high
with
little
returns
.
In
fact
,
we
often
forget
that
some
Zambezians
are
hurt
by
attempts
to
protect
the
black
rhino
.
While
rural
villagers
respect
the
rhino
and
would
prefer
to
see
them
protected
,
rhinos
impose
tremendous
costs
on
villagers
.
One
rhino
stampede
can
destroy
an
entire
village
and
in
the
normal
course
of
their
lives
,
rhinos
cause
tremendous
damage
to
crops
vitally
important
to
the
survival
of
villagers
.
When
a
villager
adds
up
the
costs
imposed
by
the
rhinos
with
the
emotional
benefit
of
having
the
rhino
protected
,
the
emotional
benefit
does
not
even
come
close
to
covering
the
cost
.
Any
successful
conservation
program
for
the
black
rhino
needs
to
ensure
that
those
who
live
in
close
contact
with
the
rhino
will
benefit
enough
from
their
existence
that
they
will
take
steps
to
protect
them
.
Based
on
my
studies
of
successful
rhino
conservation
programs
in
countries
like
Zimbabwe
and
South
Africa
,
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
best
way
to
ensure
that
the
black
rhino
survives
in
Zambezia
is
to
eliminate
communal
ownership
of
the
black
rhino
.
Putting
ownership
of
Zambezia
’
s
rhinos
into
private
hands
will
overcome
the
problems
endemic
to
the
failures
of
our
past
conservation
efforts
because
private
owners
have
a
strong
incentive
to
care
for
and
protect
their
property
—
the
rhinos
.
If
private
owners
successfully
protect
the
rhinos
from
poachers
,
they
stand
to
reap
the
benefits
of
that
protection
.
Contrast
that
result
with
the
corruption
prevalent
under
the
Rhino
Protection
Zones
.
Each
guard
had
no
direct
stake
in
the
conservation
of
an
individual
rhino
,
yet
he
could
directly
benefit
from
looking
the
other
way
.
The
incentives
to
protect
the
rhino
were
completely
wrong
under
public
stewardship
and
would
be
much
improved
under
private
ownership
.
13
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