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Marzo-Septiembre  2006

An Economic Approach to Conservation: The Rhino Conservation Act of 2005

CategoríaMarzo-Septiembre 2006Management

Joshua Hall

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__________________________________________________________________ Joshua Hall An Economic Approach to Conservation : The Rhino Conservation Act of 2005 The Rhino Conservation Act of 2005 1 A Radio Address by the Zambezian President Joshua Hall is a Ph . D . candidate ( Economics ) at West Virginia University , Morgantown , West Virginia , USA . Introduction Good morning . Thank you for taking the time to listen today . I know how expensive radio time is for many of you so I will keep my remarks brief . 2 Tomorrow I will sign into law the Rhino Conservation Act . This act is designed to protect our indigenous rhinoceros population and stimulate development in rural Zambezia . 1 This essay is economic fiction , in the tradition of the work of Russell Roberts ( The Choice and The Invisible Heart ) and Jonathan Wight ( Saving Adam Smith ). While the country Zambezia , its newly elected president , and the Rhino Conservation Act are not real , I have attempted to be factually accurate about the rhino situation and the possibility of reform along the lines discussed in this fictional presidential address . The purpose of the footnotes is therefore to provide the reader with additional explanations , sources of information contained in the address , and suggestions for further reading . 2 For more on the importance of radio as a means of communication in Africa , see Petra Cahill , Bringing Radio to Rural Africa ,” MSNBC . com , 20 May 2004 ( http :// www . msn bc . msn . com / id / 4953281 /) __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 98
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__________________________________________________________________ I am taking this rare opportunity to address you because this policy represents a dramatic departure from previous government policy towards the black rhinoceros and I wanted the opportunity to explain why such a dramatic change is the appropriate course of action . A Short History of Conservation Attempts One thing is clear : Zambezia s attempts to save the black rhinoceros have not been effective . According to the African Rhino Specialist Group , there are only 3 , 600 black rhinos in the entire world today . 3 Given how low current numbers are , it is difficult to believe that black rhinoceros used to be plentiful throughout our country and the rest of Africa . The black rhino population was estimated to be as high as 65 , 000 in 1970 . 4 However , an increased demand for traditional Asian medicines containing black rhino beginning in the early 1970 s fueled an increase in poaching . By one estimate , the black rhino population in Africa fell by 96 percent from 1970 to 1992 . 5 3 http :// www . rhinos-irf . org / rhinoinformation / populationtable . htm ( accessed 10 May 2005 ). 4 Mike Milliken , Rhinos by the Horn ,” Cites C&M , November 1996 , 6-13 ( cited in Michael De Alessi , Private Conservation and Black Rhinos in Zimbabwe : The Save Valley and Bubiana Conservancies [ Washington , DC : Competitive Enterprise Institute , January 2000 ]). During the past thirty-five years the Zambezian government tried many different approaches to saving the rhinos . At first we became heavily involved in international attempts to make the trade of rhino horn illegal . Our hope was that the stiff penalties associated with the international sale of rhino horn would make poaching more expensive . While we were successful in getting the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ( CITES ) to ban the international trade of rhino horn in 1977 , the ban proved ineffective in discouraging poaching . In fact , the resulting decline in available rhino horn actually increased the profits to poaching and encouraged poachers to step up their efforts . 6 Next , we tried dehorning ,” where government employees removed the horns of all the black rhinos in Zambezia in hopes to eliminate any incentive poachers had to kill the rhinos . Again , we were wrong . It often takes days to track one rhino , and if poachers inadvertently tracked a dehorned rhino , they would often kill it to save themselves the expense of accidentally tracking the same dehorned rhino again . 7 Another unforeseen issue with dehorning as a long term strategy of rhino conservation is that rhino horns grow back very quickly , at a rate of nearly 9 cm a year . 8 Nine centime- 6 See , for example , Michael t Sas Rolfes , Does CITES Work ? Four Case Studies ( London : Institute of Economic Affairs , 1997 ). If anything , [ the ban ] led to a sharp increase in the black market price of rhino horn , which simply fueled further poaching and encouraged speculative stockpiling of horn .” 5 WWF , Black Rhinoceros Fact Sheet ,” prepared for the 13 th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES , Bangkok , October 2- 14 . Available online at : http :// panda . org / dow nloads / species / ecop13blackrhinofactsheet . pdf 7 De Alessi , Private Conservation and Black Rhinos in Zimbabwe . 8 Joel Berger , Carol Cunningham , A . Archie Gawuseb , and Malan Lindeque , “‘ Costs and __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 99
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__________________________________________________________________ ters of horn can garner a poacher several thousand dollars on the black market , meaning it will not take long after dehorning for a rhino to once again become a target of poachers . Furthermore , researchers found that poachers do not discriminate between large and small horned rhinos , and so dehorned rhinos are not immune from attempted poaching . 9 Even if poachers did discriminate , in a country as sparsely populated as Zambezia , it was impossible to keep track of the regeneration of rhino horns . Knowing this , poachers continued to cross our borders and indiscriminately kill rhinos in the hopes that they had a harvestable horn . Dehorning also had two additional problems that made it an unsuitable rhino conservation strategy for Zambezia . First , there was some evidence that rhino calf mortality increased after dehorning because hornless mother rhinos had difficulties defending their young from predators . 10 Second , dehorning was a very expensive process , costing up to $ 1000 per rhino . 11 It soon became apparent that it was politically untenable to spend so much money on rhino conservation when so many of our citizens are living in abject poverty . Most recently our government tried to limit poaching by creating Rhino Protec- Short-Term Survivorship of Hornless Black Rhinos ,” Conservation Biology , 7 ( December 1993 ): 920-24 . tion Zones . These zones were sanctuaries for rhino that were patrolled by antipoaching security forces . At first , the sanctuaries worked fairly well . However , two problems quickly arose . First , like dehorning , the Rhino Protection Zones were very expensive and political support for them was extremely weak . Second , corruption proved to a very big problem . The potential gains from poaching one rhino were more than a security force member would make in an entire year . While Rhino Protection Zones did a good job of protecting from external poachers , they seemed to exacerbate internal poaching . 12 The failure of these three approaches is why the first thing I did upon entering office was to convene a task force to study the issue and propose a solution . Their recommendations have manifested themselves in the Rhino Conservation Act . The Reasons Why Our Past Efforts Failed Before discussing what the Rhino Conservation Act will do , let me explain to you why Zambezia s previous efforts to save the black rhinos have failed . It is my hope that if you understand why our past efforts have failed , you will better understand the need to make such a radical change in policy . 9 ibid . 10 Joel Berger and Carol Cunningham , Phenotypic Alterations , Evolutionary Significant Structures , and Rhino Conservation ,” Conservation Biology , 8 ( Sept 1994 ): 833-40 . 11 De Alessi , Private Conservation and Black Rhinos in Zimbabwe , p . 3 . 12 This discussion draws on the history of Zimbabwe s Intensive Protection Zones ( IPZs ). According to Michael De Alessi , The IPZs were an improvement , but failed to address the corruption issue or to adequately protect the remaining rhinos ”( Private Conservation and Black Rhinos in Zimbabwe , p . 4 ). __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 100
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__________________________________________________________________ The primary reason for the failure of rhino conservation in Zambezia is because Zambezians had insufficient incentive to protect the rhino ; rhinos are common property . In one sense this is a good thing , because all of our people have a vested interest in the fate of the rhino . However , when it comes to actually taking steps to protect the rhino , few Zambezians have incentives to prevent poaching . This was not a problem as long as the demand for rhino horn was low . This is why so many rural villagers are hostile to rhino conservation efforts . Not because they are anti-rhino , but because they do not see current conservation efforts accomplishing more than 13 For more on the importance of property hurting them . Not only did past conserva- rights to encouraging property owners to __________________________________________________________________ Laissez-Faire 101 tion efforts take valuable aid dollars away from rural villagers , but villagers were prevented from protecting their own property from the rhinos . Furthermore , the level of resentment from the rural villagers to the city dwellers is extremely high because the villagers feel as though they are bearing the entire burden of protecting the rhino . The Rhino Conservation Act As the demand for rhino horn increased , the fact that the black rhinos were common property became problematic . While poachers had a lot to gain from killing a black rhino and harvesting its horn , each individual Zambezian had nothing to gain and much to lose by stopping the poachers . Even collectively we had little incentive to stop the poaching because the cost was high with little returns . In fact , we often forget that some Zambezians are hurt by attempts to protect the black rhino . While rural villagers respect the rhino and would prefer to see them protected , rhinos impose tremendous costs on villagers . One rhino stampede can destroy an entire village and in the normal course of their lives , rhinos cause tremendous damage to crops vitally important to the survival of villagers . When a villager adds up the costs imposed by the rhinos with the emotional benefit of having the rhino protected , the emotional benefit does not even come close to covering the cost . Any successful conservation program for the black rhino needs to ensure that those who live in close contact with the rhino will benefit enough from their existence that they will take steps to protect them . Based on my studies of successful rhino conservation programs in countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa , I have come to the conclusion that the best way to ensure that the black rhino survives in Zambezia is to eliminate communal ownership of the black rhino . Putting ownership of Zambezia s rhinos into private hands will overcome the problems endemic to the failures of our past conservation efforts because private owners have a strong incentive to care for and protect their property the rhinos . If private owners successfully protect the rhinos from poachers , they stand to reap the benefits of that protection . Contrast that result with the corruption prevalent under the Rhino Protection Zones . Each guard had no direct stake in the conservation of an individual rhino , yet he could directly benefit from looking the other way . The incentives to protect the rhino were completely wrong under public stewardship and would be much improved under private ownership . 13
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