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__________________________________________________________________
David
C
.
Martinez-Amador
A
Short
Note
on
Plato
In
the
present
essay
I
will
provide
a
general
account
of
Plato
’
s
critique
of
democracy
,
and
the
knowledge
upon
which
is
founded
.
Subsequently
,
I
tackle
the
issue
of
whether
it
is
possible
to
build
a
conception
of
democratic
knowledge
based
on
Plato
’
s
theory
of
knowledge
.
Although
there
are
a
few
different
conceptions
of
knowledge
present
in
the
various
Platonic
dialogues
,
for
the
sake
of
the
present
work
I
will
rely
on
Plato
’
s
theory
as
presented
in
the
Republic
.
Among
other
things
,
I
argue
that
presupposing
this
theory
of
knowledge
gives
way
to
a
strong
critique
of
democracy
and
the
knowledge
upon
which
it
is
based
.
Nonetheless
,
other
dialogues
will
be
brought
up
in
relation
to
my
main
argument
.
1
Before
engaging
Plato
’
s
explicit
critique
of
democracy
,
it
is
worth
mentioning
that
his
critique
is
part
of
a
broader
argument
against
Athenian
mentality
in
general
.
The
Apology
is
a
good
example
of
this
.
In
this
dialogue
,
the
Socratic
practice
of
philosophy
is
portrayed
not
so
much
as
propositional
but
as
a
negative
1
It
is
important
to
clarify
that
due
to
the
nature
of
the
question
being
posed
in
this
essay
,
I
will
not
stress
issues
concerning
the
consistency
of
some
lines
of
argument
through
the
different
dialogues
.
The
main
argument
will
focus
more
on
points
of
continuity
between
the
dialogues
,
than
on
points
of
rupture
.
Also
,
the
issue
of
dividing
the
Platonic
dialogues
into
early
/
middle
/
later
,
and
its
consequence
as
to
the
Platonic
conceptions
and
his
portrayals
of
Socrates
,
will
not
be
assessed
in
the
present
essay
.
activity
which
consists
in
the
critique
of
the
established
behaviour
of
the
Athenians
,
through
a
process
of
self-
and
crossexamination
.
He
critiques
Athenians
for
presuming
to
know
without
knowing
,
and
for
paying
too
much
attention
to
wealth
,
reputation
,
and
honors
,
instead
of
caring
for
wisdom
,
truth
,
and
the
best
possible
state
of
the
soul
(
Apology
,
29d-e
).
Socrates
wants
Athenians
“
to
care
for
virtue
”
(
ibid
.,
31b
),
and
not
do
“
anything
unjust
or
impious
”
(
ibid
.,
32d
).
In
the
Apology
,
Socrates
also
argues
—
referring
primarily
of
course
to
himself
—
that
to
strive
for
justice
and
do
philosophy
one
needs
to
lead
a
private
life
,
meaning
that
he
thought
the
political
order
of
the
city
was
unjust
:
“
A
man
who
really
fights
for
justice
must
lead
a
private
,
not
a
public
,
life
if
he
is
to
survive
for
even
a
short
time
”
(
ibid
.,
32a
).
In
the
Republic
,
contrary
to
the
Apology
,
the
critique
of
the
democratic
state
and
the
democratic
citizen
presupposes
the
previous
establishment
of
a
definition
of
justice
and
a
theory
of
knowledge
.
In
the
creation
of
the
ideal
city
,
justice
is
defined
through
the
principle
of
specialization
.
In
other
words
,
each
specific
class
has
a
particular
function
and
role
to
play
in
the
Kallipolis
.
Moreover
,
this
form
of
specialization
impedes
individual
groups
from
meddling
in
the
affairs
of
the
other
classes
;
to
do
so
would
constitute
injus-
David
Martinez-Amador
es
Director
del
Centro
de
Investigación
Internacional
Ibn
Khaldun
,
Universidad
Francisco
Marroquín
,
Guatemala
.
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tice
(
Republic
,
434c-d
).
To
achieve
justice
,
however
,
a
meticulous
process
of
formation
and
education
is
required
.
This
first
program
of
education
strives
for
the
moderation
of
the
guardians
,
and
it
consists
on
a
tightly
managed
administration
of
the
kind
of
stories
,
imitations
,
styles
,
and
rhythms
that
are
going
to
be
permitted
within
the
city
.
Unprejudiced
imitation
,
which
is
a
critique
of
the
democratic
city
and
its
formative
institutions
such
as
the
theater
is
condemned
(
ibid
.,
394d-
396b
).
The
institutions
of
democracy
are
further
undermined
because
these
stories
depict
gods
fighting
one
another
,
betraying
,
etc
.,
and
this
is
an
explicit
attack
on
the
tragedians
,
who
played
an
important
part
in
the
education
of
the
democratic
citizens
.
Second
,
through
the
establishment
of
the
theory
of
knowledge
in
the
Republic
,
democracy
will
be
seen
as
a
disorderly
state
based
on
unending
individual
desires
and
based
on
opinion
instead
of
knowledge
.
The
theory
of
knowledge
has
as
its
main
goal
to
achieve
knowledge
of
the
good
,
not
only
because
it
represents
the
supreme
form
of
knowledge
,
but
also
because
“
it
’
s
by
their
relation
to
it
that
just
things
and
the
others
become
useful
and
beneficial
”
(
ibid
.,
505a
).
The
theory
of
knowledge
is
presented
through
the
line
analogy
in
book
VI
and
the
allegory
of
the
cave
in
book
VII
,
although
it
emerges
from
an
initial
distinction
between
knowledge
and
opinion
in
book
V
(
ibid
.,
478a-e
).
The
line
analogy
presents
a
picture
of
different
degrees
or
gradations
of
knowledge
.
It
portrays
mainly
a
division
of
knowledge
into
two
realms
of
reality
,
the
intelligible
world
[
true
reality
]
and
the
visible
world
[
world
of
appearances
]
(
ibid
.,
509d
),
to
which
correspond
the
main
division
in
the
degrees
of
knowledge
,
the
realm
of
knowledge
and
the
realm
of
opinion
.
To
the
realm
of
knowledge
proper
,
of
the
intelligible
,
correspond
two
gradations
,
that
of
Understanding
and
that
of
Thought
,
while
the
realm
of
the
visible
or
of
opinion
is
divided
into
Belief
and
Imagination
.
Within
the
realm
of
opinion
or
of
the
visible
,
the
poorest
or
lowest
type
of
wisdom
is
Imagination
.
This
wisdom
only
grasps
images
,
that
is
,
“
shadows
,
then
reflections
in
water
and
in
all
closepacked
,
smooth
,
and
shiny
materials
,
and
everything
of
that
sort
”
(
ibid
.,
509d-e
).
The
upper
level
within
the
realm
of
opinion
is
occupied
by
Belief
,
through
which
we
can
grasp
the
original
things
from
which
images
are
produced
:
“
In
the
other
subsection
of
the
visible
,
put
the
originals
of
these
images
,
namely
,
the
animals
around
us
,
all
the
plants
,
and
the
whole
class
of
manufactured
things
”
(
ibid
.,
510a
).
The
realm
of
knowledge
,
for
its
part
,
is
constituted
first
by
Thought
,
and
then
by
Understanding
.
Thought
(
ibid
.,
510b
,
511a
)
starts
by
using
hypotheses
based
on
abstractions
from
the
things
grasped
by
belief
.
Thought
is
still
related
to
the
visible
world
in
that
it
takes
concrete
things
as
guiding
principles
.
Understanding
a-
chieves
a
more
complete
independence
from
the
visible
world
,
since
it
uses
the
previous
hypotheses
not
as
“
first
principle
”
but
as
real
hypotheses
through
which
dialectic
achieves
“
the
un-hypothetical
first
principle
of
everything
”
(
ibid
.,
511b
),
and
then
conducts
itself
through
the
forms
of
things
themselves
.
On
the
other
hand
,
the
allegory
of
the
cave
depicts
also
the
journey
of
the
philosopher
towards
knowledge
of
the
Good
.
Only
after
achieving
knowledge
of
the
Good
,
or
looking
at
the
sun
in
the
alle-
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gory
,
must
the
people
compel
the
philosopher
to
come
back
and
rule
the
kallipolis
.
The
consolidation
and
maintenance
of
the
just
city
needs
the
ruling
of
the
philosopher-king
who
achieves
knowledge
of
the
Good
.
It
is
important
to
have
this
theory
of
knowledge
in
mind
when
taking
into
account
the
critique
of
democracy
and
the
knowledge
upon
which
it
rests
.
If
we
assume
the
Republic
’
s
theory
of
knowledge
,
then
the
kallipolis
constructed
out
of
words
will
be
the
only
political
order
based
on
real
knowledge
.
In
that
sense
,
the
democratic
order
is
not
based
on
knowledge
proper
,
but
on
opinion
,
which
—
while
not
being
ignorance
—
is
like
an
ambiguity
(
ibid
.,
479b
)
that
lies
between
knowledge
and
ignorance
,
between
being
and
not-being
.
This
means
that
democracy
’
s
foundational
knowledge
itself
is
unstable
,
not
fixed
.
It
is
not
accidental
,
then
,
that
in
Book
VIII
Plato
presents
such
a
harsh
critique
of
democracy
,
being
the
next
to
worst
in
the
degeneration
of
the
political
order
.
In
contrast
to
the
fixed
order
of
the
kallipolis
through
which
Plato
provides
the
just
city
,
democracy
is
full
of
freedom
up
to
the
point
where
everybody
has
the
license
to
do
what
he
wants
(
ibid
.,
557b
),
meaning
that
democracy
is
an
unjust
order
,
in
which
someone
can
potentially
meddle
in
the
affairs
pertinent
to
others
.
This
freedom
of
its
subjects
makes
the
democratic
order
a
mixed
one
in
which
one
can
find
“
all
kinds
of
constitutions
”
(
ibid
.,
557d
).
The
democratic
citizen
does
not
have
knowledge
,
but
false
beliefs
(
ibid
.,
560c
)
and
useless
desires
(
ibid
.,
560d
).
They
invert
previous
values
into
new
ones
:
“
…
calling
insolence
good
breeding
,
anarchy
freedom
,
extravagance
magnificence
,
and
shamelessness
courage
”
(
ibid
.,
560e
).
In
other
words
,
they
invert
some
of
the
most
valued
and
necessary
elements
of
the
kallipolis
,
such
as
moderation
,
courage
,
and
fixity
.
This
license
and
freedom
makes
citizens
even
disrespectful
of
the
laws
.
The
extreme
freedom
which
is
constitutive
of
democracy
and
its
citizens
,
argues
Plato
,
will
eventually
bring
its
own
dissolution
and
make
it
possible
for
a
tyrant
to
come
into
existence
.
Another
important
critique
to
the
knowledge
upon
which
the
democratic
order
is
built
is
presented
in
the
dialogue
Gorgias
.
This
is
a
very
important
dialogue
because
it
contains
a
profound
critique
of
democratic
knowledge
and
the
different
statesmen
of
Athens
,
as
well
as
the
general
Athenian
mentality
concerning
the
issue
of
politics
and
justice
.
It
begins
with
Socrates
wanting
to
find
out
about
the
nature
of
rhetoric
.
It
is
not
fortuitous
that
rhetoric
is
the
center
of
discussion
since
it
is
accepted
that
it
plays
a
very
important
part
in
the
functioning
of
democracy
.
For
example
,
when
Gorgias
is
arguing
about
rhetoric
as
a
powerful
tool
of
persuasion
and
its
value
,
he
says
:
I
’
m
referring
to
the
ability
to
persuade
by
speeches
judges
in
a
law
court
,
councillors
in
a
council
meeting
,
and
assemblymen
in
an
assembly
or
in
any
other
political
gathering
that
might
take
place
.
In
point
of
fact
,
with
this
ability
you
’
ll
have
the
doctor
for
your
slave
,
and
the
physical
trainer
,
too
.
As
for
the
financial
expert
of
yours
,
he
’
ll
turn
out
to
be
making
more
money
for
somebody
else
instead
of
himself
;
for
you
,
in
fact
,
if
you
’
ve
got
the
ability
to
speak
and
to
persuade
the
crowds
(
Gorgias
,
452e
).
This
passage
shows
the
centrality
of
rhetoric
within
all
the
activities
that
were
commonly
held
to
be
most
important
.
It
is
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no
wonder
then
that
it
preoccupies
Socrates
so
much
.
After
that
,
Gorgias
further
determines
his
definition
by
saying
that
rhetoric
is
the
art
of
persuasion
used
in
courts
of
law
and
assemblies
,
and
that
it
concerns
itself
with
what
is
just
and
unjust
(
ibid
.,
454b
).
Since
it
deals
with
such
an
important
issue
as
justice
,
Socrates
wants
to
find
out
if
rhetoric
provides
real
knowledge
or
if
it
simply
provides
belief
.
Socrates
will
argue
that
if
rhetoric
is
able
to
persuade
learned
people
,
it
must
not
be
knowledge
,
but
belief
.
For
example
,
in
the
area
of
medicine
the
rhetorician
is
able
to
persuade
not
only
the
ignorant
of
medicinal
knowledge
,
but
also
the
expert
in
it
.
The
rhetorician
can
overpower
every
specific
expert
,
without
needing
to
have
the
specific
knowledge
that
the
expert
has
.
Gorgias
has
to
accept
that
rhetoric
provides
only
belief
,
and
not
knowledge
,
about
what
is
just
and
unjust
(
ibid
.,
455a
).
If
we
take
into
account
what
has
just
been
presented
,
we
find
a
further
critique
of
democratic
knowledge
.
Plato
is
presenting
rhetoric
as
the
type
of
wisdom
assumed
in
the
general
functioning
of
the
democracy
.
If
rhetoric
produces
only
belief
and
not
knowledge
,
democracy
’
s
foundation
is
flawed
from
the
start
.
In
addition
,
politics
—
according
to
Socrates
in
the
Gorgias
—
is
an
art
of
the
soul
.
It
should
be
interested
in
what
is
best
and
not
in
what
is
most
pleasant
.
In
dispute
with
Callicles
—
who
represents
also
the
common
mentality
2
—
Socrates
2
Another
important
element
in
the
discussion
with
Callicles
is
his
notion
of
justice
as
the
ruler
possessing
more
than
his
subjects
,
which
advances
to
some
extent
Thrasymachus
’
definition
of
justice
as
being
the
interargues
that
the
duty
of
the
public
man
is
to
improve
the
citizens
(
ibid
.,
515d
),
and
not
as
Athenian
statesmen
had
done
.
Unlike
public
officers
in
the
democratic
order
,
Socrates
states
that
before
engaging
with
politics
,
a
person
must
first
strive
to
know
and
practice
virtue
.
Only
then
will
we
gain
a
better
knowledge
with
which
to
govern
a
city
:
Nothing
terrible
will
happen
to
you
if
you
really
are
an
admirable
and
good
man
,
one
who
practices
excellence
.
And
then
,
after
we
’
ve
practiced
it
together
,
then
at
last
,
if
we
think
we
should
,
we
’
ll
turn
to
politics
,
or
then
we
’
ll
deliberate
about
whatever
subject
we
please
,
when
we
’
re
better
at
deliberating
than
we
are
now
(
ibid
.,
527d
).
It
is
left
for
us
now
to
see
if
it
is
possible
to
build
an
alternative
democratic
knowledge
based
on
Plato
’
s
theory
of
knowledge
.
If
we
insist
,
for
example
,
in
the
Republic
’
s
theory
of
knowledge
,
the
project
will
be
doomed
from
the
very
beginning
due
to
the
undemocratic
assumptions
of
this
conception
.
The
achievement
of
true
knowledge
,
of
knowledge
of
the
Good
,
in
this
conception
already
assumes
an
antidemocratic
foundation
because
it
rests
on
the
established
division
of
the
city
into
the
three
hierarchical
components
and
its
legitimization
through
the
falsehood
of
the
myth
of
metals
,
which
will
say
:
All
of
you
in
the
city
are
brothers
,
[...]
but
the
god
who
made
you
mixed
some
gold
into
those
who
are
adequately
equipped
to
rule
,
because
they
are
the
most
valuable
.
He
put
silver
in
those
who
are
auxiliaries
and
iron
and
bronze
in
the
farmers
and
other
craftsmen
.
[...]
So
the
first
and
est
of
the
stronger
,
presented
in
Book
I
of
the
Republic
.
__________________________________________________________________
Laissez-Faire
54
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